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CURRENT DECISIONS
and is "powerless to stop drinking." " He is apparently under the same
disability as the person who is forced to drink and since the
involuntary drunk is excused from his actions, a logical analogy
would leave the chronic alcoholic with the same defense. How-
ever, the court refuses to either follow through, refute, or even men-
tion the analogy and thus overlook the serious implication of the state-
ments asserting that when the alcoholic drinks it is not his act. It is con-
tent with the ruling that alcoholism and its recognized symptoms,
specifically public drunkenness, cannot be punished.
Charles McDonald
Criminal Law-MuEDER-PROOF OF MALICE. In Biddle v. Common-
'wealtb,' the defendant was convicted of murder by starvation in the
first degree of her infant, child and on appeal she claimed that the
lower court erred in admitting her confession and that the evidence was
not sufficient to sustain the first degree murder conviction. The evi-
dence indicated that the defendant had the ability and means to feed
the infant. An autopsy revealed that the infant had not been fed for
several days as the entire intestinal tract and stomach were empty.
There was no evidence of any disease and the infant when born was
in perfect health.
The Supreme Court of Appeals-of Virginia ruled that the confessions
were admissible but reversed the lower court on the grounds that the
Commonwealth had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant wilfully or maliciously withheld food from the infant as re-
quired by Virginia Code Section 18.1-21, under which defendant had
been convicted.
The Virginia statute states that:
"Murder by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving ... is
murder in the first degree. All other murder is murder of the second
degree."2
Although both an intent to kill and malice are usually necessary
24. Public Health Service publication, No. 730, "Alcoholism', as prepared by the
National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health, US. Department of
Health Education and Welfare (1965).
1. 206 Va. 14, 141 S.E.2d 710 (1965).
2. VA. CODE AN., § 18.1-21 (1964 Cure. Supp.).
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to constitute murder in the first degree, the Virginia courts in in-
terpreting this statute have held that homicide by any of the means
enumerated is murder in the first degree even without an actual
intent to kill,3 yet the killing must still be a wilful or malicious
act and this element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The malicious element of the crime can be either express or im-
plied.4 Implied malice is inferred from a wilful and deliberate act
and may be assumed from the circumstances attending the killing.'
It has been held, for example, that malice may be inferred from the
act done and the probability of death resulting;6 from the character
of the killing itself;7 or by evidence establishing a "reckless disregard of
human life, and a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mis-
chief, existence which is inferred from the acts done or words spoken." 8
In Bristow v. Commonwealti? the court held "that a man must be taken
to intend that which he does, or which is the immediate or necessary
consequence of his act," and the law will imply malice from the wilful
act. Another Virginia case held that if the act is dangerous and in-
dicates a disregard of human life causing the death of another, the
act is murder even though he didn't intend to kill.' Thus it is suffi-
cient under the Virginia statute to convict one of first degree mur-
der even though there was no actual intent to kill provided that express
or implied malice was proven.
The amount of evidence necessary to prove malice in order to con-
vict one of murder by starvation had never been decided by a Virginia
court. The general rule in regard to this type of homicide is stated that
if the evidence shows that the neglect was careless only, then the killing
3. Merrit v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 180 S.E. 395 (1935); Howell v. Common-
wealth, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 995 (1875); Jones v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 654
(1829); 2 Bish. Cr. Law 686 (1923), states that "... . if the exposure or neglect is of a
dangerous kind, it is murder. For example, if from an infant of tender years the per-
son under obligation to provide for it wilfully withholds needful food or any other
needful thing, though not with the intent to kill, and by reason thereof the child dies,
he commits murder."
4. Stapleton v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 825, 96 S.E. 801 (1918); Harrison v. Common-
wealth 79 Va. (4 Hans.) 374 (1884); VA. CoDE ANN. § 18.1-21, p. 162.
5. Presley v. Commonwealth, 185" Va. 261, 38 SZE.2d 476 (1946); Scott v. Common-
wealth, 143 Va. 510, 129 SE. 360 (1925).
6. State v. Litman, 106 Conn. 345, 138 Ad. 132 (1927).
7. Oliver v. Commonwealth, 151 Va. 533, 145 SE. 307 (1928); Hudson v. State, 207
Ark. 18, 179 S.W.2d 164 (1944); Farino v. State, 203 Wis. 374, 234 N.W. 366 (1931).
8. Burkhart v. State, 127 Tex. Crim. 1, 74 S.W.2d 692 (1934).
9. 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 634 (1859); also Scott v. Commonwealth, supra note 5.
10. State v. Saunders, 108 W.Va. 148, 150 S.E. 519 (1929).
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is manslaughter," however, if the evidence indicates that the death was
the result of a wilful neglect or the direct consequence of a malicious
omission of a duty, then it is murder.'2 Thus whether the killing is
manslaughter or murder depends upon the nature and character of the
neglect.'" Among the few cases dealing with murder by starvation,
several indicate that murder convictions have been sustained. In a recent
Massachusetts case the court held that one who intentionally withholds
foods and liquids from a baby and as a result it dies is guilty of murder.'4
Furthermore, in Lewis v. State15 a conviction of murder was given to
one who caused the death of a child by failure to supply proper food
and by exposure to inclement weather. In Williams v. State' the court
stated that if the mother maliciously placed her child near a hot stove
the act was murder. Several other cases also have held that the wilful
omission of a duty resulting in death, such as the duty of a mother to
feed a child, is murder.'7
In the present case the Virginia Supreme Court acknowledged the
general rule in starvation cases and found that the evidence was not
sufficient to establish the malice necessary for murder in the first degree.
The reasons given by the appellate court were that the defendant had
been upset by a family argument and that from a general consideration
of all the facts the verdict was not supported by the evidence. Ordinar-
ily an appellate court will not reverse a judgment unless it is clearly
wrong because of the trial courts position in hearing and seeing the
witnesses.'8 Nevertheless, the court reversed and gave no other reasons
except for the provocation caused by the family argument. In Common-
11. Pallis v. State, 123 Ala. 12, 26 So. 339 (1899); Gibson v. Commonwealth, 106
Ky. 360, 50 S.W. 532 (1899); Craig v. State of Maryland, 200 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684
(1959); Stehr v. State of Nebraska, 92 Neb. 755, 139 N.W. 676 (1913); Reg. v. Handley,
13 Cox C. C. 79 (1875).
12. Commonwealth v. Hall, 322 Mass. 523, 78 NE.2d 644 (1948); Lewis v. State, 72
Ga. 164 (1883); 47 HAav. L. Rnv. 531-3 (1934).
13. Territory v. Manton, 8 Mont. 95, 19 P. 387 (1888).
14. Commonwealth v. Hall, supra note 12.
15. 72 Ga. 164 (1883).
16. 88 Ga. App. 761, 77 SE.2d 770 (1953).
17. Rex v. Saunders, 7 C. + P. 277, 173 Eng. R. 122 (1928); Rex v. Plurnmer, 1
Car. + K. 600, 174 Eng. R. 954 (1929); Rex v. Crumpton, Car. + M. 597, 174 Eng.
R. 651 (1929); Reg. v. Gibbons and Proctor, 13 Cr. App. R. 134 (1918) (case held
that both husband and wife guilty of murder for starving daughter).
18. Howell v. Commonwealth, supra note 3; Reed v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. (22
Gratt.) 924 (1872); VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-491 (1950).
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'wealth v. Hall,19 under a similar factual situation, the Massachusetts
appellate court upheld a murder conviction stating that "we have no
doubt that such conduct obtaining here would constitute murder.. "
and that the evidence warranted the finding that her act of starving the
infant was malicious. The defendant in the present case, as in the Massa-
chusetts case, owed a duty to support and maintain her child,2° and
which duty was neglected. The evidence in each case indicated de-
fendant's disregard of her infant's life, especially since each defendant
had the means and ability to provide for the infant.21 Thus under similar
facts the two courts have reached different decisions. The only variance
appears to be the stress laid upon the family argument as provocation
by the Virginia court.
It has been held that it is not sufficient provocation to neglect to sup-
port a child because of any marital dereliction2 or censural conduct2a
by either parent. In a recent South Dakota case the court expressly
stated that a child is not deprived of the duty owed to it by its parents
because of any family argument.24 However, under the circumstances
of the present case the Virginia court has either accepted a family
argument as sufficient provocation to justify defendant's neglect to
support her child or in finding adequate provocation the court has laid
undue influence to the family quarrel in its reasoning and as a result has
been "more lenient to her than she seems to have been to this dependent
and helpless child." 25
Robert A. Hendel
19. Commonwealth v. Hall, supra note 12 (the evidence in this case indicated that
defendant's baby was illegitimate but that by the law of the state the mother still
owed a duty to support it; medical evidence revealed no signs of disease and that the
baby died of starvation and dehydration as a result of the defendant's having left the
infant in the attic without providing food for several days).
20. McClaugherty v. McClaugherty, 180 Va. 51, 21 S.E.2d 761 (1942); Boaze v.
Commonwealth, 165 Va. 786, 183 SE. 263 (1936); Michalcoe v. Holub, 130 Va. 425,
107 SE. 704 (1921 ) (case held that it is legal duty of a parent to support his child and
not merely a moral obligation).
21. State v. Noakes, 70 Vt. 247, 40 Ad. 249 (1897) (states that to prove guilt in
starvation cases there must be the capacity, means, and ability to support the child);
Rex v. Saunders, supra note 17 (case held that if husband supplied wife with food +
she wilfully neglects to give it-then it is murder); Lewis v. State, supra note 15.
22. Parivash v. Yousef, 214 A2d 314 (NJ. 1965).
23. Fry v. State, 36 Ga. App. 312, 136 SE. 466 (1927); also Commonwealth v. Hall,
supra note 12 (held that even the fact that an infant is illegitimate does not provide
sufficient provocation to take its life).
24. State v. Zobel, 134 N.W.2d 109 (SD. 1965).
25. Lewis v. State, 72 Ga. 171 (1883).
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